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Abstract—Blockchain is a disruptive technology that has been
widely characterised to be the next big thing. Regardless whether
the expectations will be met, the technology has already gained a
broad recognition by experts in diverse fields, due to its envisaged
profound applications in many sectors and industries, including
consumer electronics. Undoubtedly, blockchain may lead to new
business models with far-reaching economic impact. In this paper,
we consider possible use cases and applications of the blockchain
for the consumer electronics industry, and its interplay with the
Internet of things. Instead of discussing how the blockchain can
revolutionise the supply chain, which has been the main subject
of numerous position articles and technical releases, we focus on
how it could be employed for enhancing the security of networked
consumer devices in a cryptographically verifiable manner. This
work is motivated by the large number of recent attacks (sign of
a growing trend) that use easily hackable devices as a weaponry
for conducting cyber-criminal activities, including the stealing of
sensitive personal information. Toward this direction, privacy and
data protection aspects of blockchain solutions are also presented
and linked to regulatory framework provisions. Information on
already existing blockchain solutions to use is also provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE vision of the Internet of things (IoT) is to establish awhole new ecosystem that is comprised of heterogeneous
connected devices communicating to deliver environments that
make the way we do business, communicate, and live far more
intelligent [5]. In the following years, almost anything in the
surrounding environment will be interconnected with billions
of other devices, as part of a network of networks. Examples
of such IoT devices include sensors and embedded devices in
buildings, transportation systems, industrial control systems,
etc., as well as, consumer electronics (CE) devices, like digital
cameras, TVs, computers, and smartphones [18].
The technological and industrial revolution that is brought
by the IoT across many sectors and industries would be greatly
amplified if it is further combined with blockchain solutions
[1], [4]. The blockchain, which is the distributed data structure
underlying the Bitcoin, provides a verifiable process for storing
transactions or digital assets, on an immutable shared ledger,
in a way that it is secure, robust (resistant to node failures),
and transparent (see Fig. 1); every transaction is accompanied
by an auditable proof that is valid and has been accepted and
mutually agreed by the nodes. The adoption of the blockchain,
or distributed ledger technology (DLT), in IoT would lead to
powerful systems, allowing IoT devices to act autonomously
and execute transactions via smart contracts [7]. Thus, beyond
its use in cryptocurrencies, the blockchain has the potential to
also impact other industries, including healthcare, retail, and
CE [10]. In fact, nearly 2/3 of the aforementioned industries
are expected to already have blockchain-based solutions in full
production by 2020 [7].
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Fig. 1. Notable advantages of the blockchain/distributed ledger technology.
The above technological evolution comes with new forms of
threats or attacks that exploit the complexity and heterogeneity
of IoT networks, therefore rendering security amongst the most
important aspects of a networked world [11]. The fact that the
number of intelligent things attributed to, or associated with,
the CE industry has greatly increased in the last few years, and
will continue to do so, amplifies concerns about the security
of networked devices, applications, and services. These often
constitute the target of attackers, since they may easily exploit
well-known vulnerabilities to accomplish their objectives, e.g.
gain unauthorised access to the CE device, take full control
of its applications, steal owner’s sensitive personal data, deny
services to legitimate users, and use it as a vehicle to launch
other advanced network attacks. Thus, there is an urgent need
for securing the communications among untrusted devices to
allow them establish trust and operate transparently.
In this paper, we investigate whether the blockchain could
be used for enhancing the security of IoT-enabled CE devices
in a cryptographically verifiable manner, along with possible
ways for this to be achieved. The fact that the blockchain
is a promising approach for increasing security and privacy
in the IoT, and the distributed network of its ecosystem, has
recently been recognised [9]. The blockchain could define the
framework for providing trusted transaction processing and
coordination between IoT devices, while ensuring privacy [7];
most importantly, this can be achieved without the presence
of a trusted third party (TTP) or even the assumption that the
devices mutually trust each other. This new paradigm, driven
by the blockchain, could bring the transparency and auditing
necessary for trusting online services. Although both academia
and industry have been extensively exploring the blockchain
and its potential applications, the area of using blockchain for
strengthening the IoT security and privacy, or for addressing
cyber-security needs in general, is still in its infancy. A lot of
grand challenges remain to be tackled, including processing
power, storage, and scalability, which are relevant (and critical)
for the application of blockchain-based solutions to IoT. The
fact that data stored on the blockchain cannot be changed and
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these are the need for long-term security, data confidentiality,
and the right to be forgotten in blockchain applications.
II. HOW THE BLOCKCHAIN WORKS
The blockchain was introduced with the Bitcoin as part of
the solution that aims at tackling, in a distributed fashion, the
double-spending problem in a trustless network of peer nodes;
it is also referred to as the Bitcoin’s backbone protocol. The
proposed solution heavily relies on cryptographic mechanisms,
ensuring the immutability —among other things— of the data
stored on the distributed ledger; moreover, a “security through
transparency” approach is taken, according to which all nodes’
transactions are publicly announced, hence allowing anyone to
verify their validity. The transactions are digitally signed with
the private key of the asset’s (i.e. coin’s in the case of Bitcoin)
owner, and therefore their authenticity is verified by using his
public key that has been included in the blockchain. A number
of new transactions is packed into a block, containing links to
transactions that already appear in the blockchain (creating a
chain of blocks), and is subsequently appended to the structure.
The maintenance of the ledger, that is, the validation of new
transactions, their aggregation into blocks, and their chaining
with the structure, is carried out by the class of network nodes
called miners. The mutual agreement on the validity (or not) of
the newly created block is performed according to a consensus
protocol. The miners also ensure that tampering, or removal,
of the blocks in the ledger is impossible, therefore making
the whole data structure immutable. In Bitcoin, the miners get
new coins as a reward for creating blocks and supporting the
network. This functions as an incentive for the miners to stay
honest by adhering to the protocol specifications.
Blockchain and IoT considerations
The design of a blockchain solution for securing IoT devices
and their transactions is not straightforward. In most cases, an
IoT device’s available resources are highly constrained, whilst
there is a need for performing transactions at high speed. These
requirements call for efficient blockchain solutions; key design
factors that determine both their security and performance, in
the context of the IoT, are briefly presented below.
Modelling: Depending on whether the ledger is open to the
public, i.e. it can be used by all network nodes, it is classified
as public or private (see Fig. 2). Moreover, if the miners that
maintain the ledger have been selected a priori, then the ledger
is called permissioned; otherwise, if any node can be a miner,
the ledger is said to be unpermissioned.
In an IoT security scenario, the blockchain that should be
designed needs not necessarily be universal; in fact, there may
be many local and global blockchains with different purposes;
the use of sidechains could also prove to be efficient in certain
cases. The model to be used in each case depends on security,
scalability, performance, and other critical for the IoT scenario
requirements. There are trade-offs between the above criteria: a
private blockchain with less users could minimise the integrity
verification time and enjoy almost immediate tamper resistance
and detection; on the other hand, this choice reduce security,
since we rely on less nodes to maintain the data structure.
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Fig. 2. Variation of different ledger technologies in the centralisation degree.
Consensus: There exist many consensus protocols that are
used by blockchain-based applications. Their objective is to
allow the nodes of the network agree on a single version of
valid transactions. Primary examples include the following:
• The proof of work (PoW) consensus is used by Bitcoin
and Ethereum. The miners have to spend a large amount
of processing power so as to solve a hard computational
problem (a block’s hash value must have a certain number
of leading zeros) and create a new transactions’ block.
• The proof of stake (PoS) is likely to be used by Ethereum.
In this case, the node to create the next block in the ledger
(and hence maintain its security) is decided according to
the percentage of coins (state) within the system.
• The proof of elapsed time (PoET) has been incorporated
in Intel’s Sawtooth Lake. The protocol depends on a fair
leader election process, realised in a trusted module, for
deciding who should extend the ledger; such modules are
available for IoT-enabled CE devices.
• The Ripple consensus protocol is another example, as it
has resiliency against adversarial faults —these have been
deliberately chosen to maximally harm the protocol; such
protocols are called Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT).
The processing power that PoW consensus algorithms require
to be devoted can be adjusted to the application needs in order
to meet performance requirements. It is clear that lowering the
hardness of the computational puzzle to solve also impacts the
security offered by the application. Hence, an optimal balance
should be found if PoW is to be used in blockchain-based IoT
applications where the speed at which the transactions can be
processed is an important choice factor.
Smart contracts: These are computer scripts that are stored
in, and are automatically executed by, a distributed ledger once
they are triggered [4]. They are written in a protocol-specific
programming language, e.g. C++, Java, Python, etc., and they
allow nodes to enjoy increased automation when creating and
executing a contract. They are an important part of blockchain-
based IoT applications, where the IoT devices are expected to
be highly autonomous (take the context of machine-to-machine
communications as an example) and transact with each other
based on some predefined criteria [15].
III. NEED FOR SECURING IOT-ENABLED CE DEVICES
Security and privacy are increasingly important factors for
the acceptance of IoT products and services by consumers and
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become ubiquitous, the task of ensuring their security becomes
increasingly difficult, since attacks get more frequent and even
more sophisticated. There are many recent examples of attacks
exploiting IoT-enabled CE appliances, like smart televisions,
refrigerators, and cameras, to perform denial of service (DoS)
and distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks, to spy on people in their
homes/offices, and hijack communication links, delivering full
control of anything that is remotely accessible and controlled
to an attacker. Recent reports indicate that DDoS, cloud-based,
and mobile attacks are among the most common attacks [17].
The availability of botnets-for-hire has led to the noticeable
increase in DDoS attacks and it is highly likely to see that the
IoT will further facilitate the formation of such botnet armies.
A recent example of DDoS attack in Oct. 2016, attributed to
Mirai botnet, affected millions of users and companies, also
crippling the servers of popular services, like Twitter, Netflix,
and PayPal; this simple malware infected the IoT devices that
used default settings and credentials.
Most of the security issues arise from devices with flawed
design or poor configuration, which allows attackers to easily
compromise them [6]. According to [17], hacking a typical
device takes around two minutes since manufacturers tend to
use publicly available and sometimes hardcoded administrative
passwords. Tools such as Shodan and IoTseeker can be easily
employed to discover such vulnerable devices. This brings the
important question of how can large-scale exploitation of such
vulnerabilities be prevented, as IoT devices have very limited
capacity for securing themselves; they cannot be equipped with
the operating systems or the multitude of security mechanisms
available on a desktop computer. Moreover, a software update
method to fix vulnerabilities and update configuration settings
is often overlooked by manufacturers, vendors, and others on
the supply chain. Further, even if such functionality is given,
there is often no efficient way to patch those devices, and the
possibility to add new vulnerabilities exists.
Many best practices have been developed in order to address
these issues. As an example, the online trust alliance (OTA)
published an IoT trust framework for the CE devices, whose
recommendations have technical counterparts that have been
widely recognised to be the cornerstone towards securing the
IoT. Among these security solutions, the following are priority
controls to implement for enhancing attack prevention [17]:
• manage efficiently the hardware devices;
• develop an inventory of authorised software;
• protect the configurations of CE devices;
• perform continuous vulnerability assessment;
• protect sensitive data and users’ privacy.
Building and managing vulnerability profiles, possibly with the
involvement of manufacturers [9], can be useful as it would
assure consumers that security & privacy issues are addressed
seriously. Realising the above is far from trivial and blockchain
may prove to be ideal toward this direction.
IV. PLACING TRUST ON THE BLOCKCHAIN
Current centralised security solutions are not adequate for
dealing with the waves of attacks and the heterogeneity of the
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Fig. 3. The blockchain functions as a distributed transaction ledger, for various
IoT transactions enhancing the security of IoT-enabled CE devices.
IoT devices. The subsequent analysis leads to the conclusion
that blockchain can be used to achieve trusted decentralised
coordination among IoT devices and help defending against
sophisticated attacks. It is expected to define a fundamentally
different approach to security, going far beyond the device’s
security alone, to also include [1], [9]:
• Identity security: blocking theft of identity, disallowing
successful use of rogue public-key certificates, countering
man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks.
• Data security: preventing data tampering, developing
access control mechanisms and keyless signature infras-
tructures (KSI) on the blockchain.
• Communication security:, protecting domain name sys-
tem (DNS) services, stopping DDoS attacks, defending
critical information infrastructures.
Specifically, the security through transparency approach of a
public blockchain has clear advantages for the IoT compared
to the usual security through obscurity model. The blockchain
will ensure the whole structure’s security due to its provable
cryptographic properties.
How will blockchain help mitigating attacks?
Attacks on connected smart devices aim at impacting their
operational integrity so that they do not strictly function within
their specified usage. For lightweight devices, lacking proper
defence mechanisms, critical information of a manufacturer’s
IoT device operation could be recorded on the blockchain so
that it can be later queried when e.g. a verification of proper
functioning is needed, or parts of the system’s software have
to be updated or patched reliably (see Fig. 3). As also noted
in [4], software updates could also be made available to the
network after having been approved/validated by a majority of
peers. This implies that multiple properties/aspects, such as a
device’s firmware, the operating system and critical software,
the system/network configuration files, and audit or event logs
could be verified against a history of previously valid states,
to ensure their integrity. Such information could be monitored
on a continual basis for illicit changes and proper actors, e.g.
the IoT service provider or the device owner, could be alerted
in case of verification failure. This approach fits well within
the current practices of the software distributors that publish
the hashes of their software binaries to allow users verify the
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MALICIOUS ATTACKS TO BLOCKCHAIN AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES [20].
Attack Definition Defensive measures
Double
spending
More than one payment is made with
a body of funds
Complexity of mining
process
Record
hacking
Blocks in the ledger are modified, or
fraudulent transactions are inserted
Distributed consensus
51%
attack
Miner of computational power more
than the rest of the network, which
dominates the verification process
Detection techniques and
robust incentives design
Identity
theft
The private key of an entity is stolen Identity reputation block-
chains
System
hacking
The software systems that implement
a blockchain are compromised
Robust systems; advanced
intrusion detection
authenticity of their copy [14]. Thus, to achieve an enhanced
security for IoT-enabled CE devices, the following phases in
their life-cycle should be considered as shown in Fig. 3.
Registration: When a product is assembled, it is registered
into a blockchain, hence linking the cryptographically secure
fingerprint of the product to an entry in the blockchain.
Update: Upon change, e.g. update of a product’s firmware,
a new fingerprint is generated and submitted to the network of
peers who will simultaneously insert the fingerprint into their
local copies of the blockchain via a consensus algorithm.
Verification: At any point, the peers can quickly verify the
properties of an IoT device by regenerating the cryptographic
fingerprint; comparison of this value against the (correct) entry
in the blockchain will then be used for proving the device’s
integrity. The advantage of using the blockchain for integrity
is that there are no keys to compromise; as a result, storing a
device’s update history on a distributed ledger makes this data
to be trusted. The assumptions under which such mechanisms
are secure are the security of the hash algorithm, as well as,
the transparency of the evidence —i.e. the publicly available
fingerprint stored on the blockchain.
Can devices establish mutual trust?
As already noted in [7], the information on the blockchain
could be leveraged to allow devices establish trust relations, or
be trusted by the network. For instance, the implementation of
CE device blacklisting by network operators has been recently
suggested as the means of protection against devices that are
considered as ultimately untrusted (e.g. stolen mobile phones).
The transparency of the blockchain makes it ideal for realising
such practices —in a general reputation-based setting [1]— in
a way that is regulated by the whole network of peer entities.
Focusing on security aspects of IoT devices (i.e. information
as to whether a device has been compromised or is known how
to achieve this) one could consider the following to evaluate
the degree to which a device can be trusted:
• Have critical files or firmware been tampered with?
• Have the latest software patches been installed?
• Is the IoT device exposed to known vulnerabilities?
• Is the network traffic generated by the device typical?
To efficiently answer these questions, the current state-of-the-
art in many security areas has to be combined. Implementing
controls for monitoring a device’s behaviour so as to protect
users’ privacy is a significant open problem in the security of
TABLE II
TAXONOMY OF VULNERABILITIES IN SMART CONTRACTS [12].
Vulnerability Cause Level
Call to the unknown The called function doesn’t exist Contract’s
Out-of-gas send Fallback of the callee is executed source code
Exception disorder Irregularity in exception handling
Type casts Contract execution type-check error
Re-entrance flaw Function re-entered prior termination
Field disclosure Private value published by miner
Immutable bug Contract altering after deployment EVM
Ether lost Send ether to orphan address bytecode
Unpredictable state Contract state change prior invoking Blockchain
Randomness bug Seed biased by malicious miner mechanism
Timestamp dependence Malicious miner changes timestamp
IoT-enabled CE devices. The manufacturer’s usage description
(MUD) specifications can be adopted for enforcing operational
usage compliance and block unusual/suspicious connections or
services,. Likewise, blockchain solutions, by relying on smart
contracts, can facilitate the wide adoption of such practices.
How secure is the blockchain?
Research on the potential applications of the blockchain and
distributed ledgers in the security area has been growing in the
last few years. There have been proposals for using blockchain
in the form of cryptocurrencies alternative to bitcoin (they are
called altcoins) or as the core structure accompanied by some
application-tailored consensus protocol [3]. Examples include
decentralised access-control management systems, where users
own and control their personal data [21], binary and certificate
transparency systems [14], and cryptocurrencies to allow a
device proving having contributed to a DDoS attack against a
specific target [19]. The security of these proposals, wherever
rigorously treated, depends on the assumptions made about the
security of the underlying blockchain data structure. However,
it is now well-understood that a holistic security analysis must
consider cryptographic (primitives employed), software (smart
contracts), and game-theoretic (incentives) aspects.
From the cryptographic viewpoint, blockchain’s properties
have been well-studied due to the attention gained by Bitcoin.
Persistence and liveness are critical properties for blockchain
security, i.e. to prevent adversaries from performing a selective
DDoS attack against account holders or mining pools; it is
known that these cannot hold if more than 1/2 of the miners
in a synchronous network are selfish (i.e. they do not follow
the protocol) —known as the 51% attack. This threshold has
been subsequently revised, using a game-theoretic approach,
to letting an adversary’s hashing power be less than about 1/3
of the network’s total hashing power. Since the assumption on
fully synchronous networks (absence of any delays in message
delivery) that is often made is unrealistic (but it gives a good
sense of the security offered), recent research efforts focus on
asynchronous networks to study the security of protocols being
built on top of the blockchain. A synopsis of main blockchain
attacks is given in Table I.
Though it is hard to modify records stored in a blockchain, it
is possible to compromise the software systems implementing
the technology; the hack of Mt. Gox, resulting in $450 million
losses, is such a notable example. Another incident is related
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a large percentage of Ether; it suffered ∼$60 million in losses
when a smart contract vulnerability was exploited leading to an
infinite recursive calling situation that blocked the invocation
of the function updating a user’s balance; a summary of such
vulnerabilities in smart contracts is provided in Table II. Many
of these vulnerabilities apply to Solidity, which constitutes the
high-level programming language supported by Ethereum.
V. PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION ON THE BLOCKCHAIN
Although blockchain is being considered as a somehow
anonymous data structure, privacy properties in this context
have never been formally stated in a provable way. A common
interpretation of privacy is that it should be considered as the
right of an individual to control how personal information is
obtained, processed, distributed, shared or used by others; i.e.
it is related to the so-called personal data processing. The term
personal data refers to information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person —a person who can be identified,
directly or indirectly. However, to determine whether a natural
person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means
reasonably likely to be used for identifying the natural person
directly or indirectly. Hence, personal data having undergone
pseudonymisation that could be attributed to a natural person
by using additional information, should be considered to be
information on an identifiable natural person.
In the case of incorporating blockchains in IoT technologies,
the IoT devices will exchange information via the distributed
ledger and smart contracts. In this scenario, each device can
be singled out, roughly resulting in device fingerprinting as
each device leaves a unique trace. Hence, when a device is
associated with an individual, then personal data processing is
in place. The above are in accordance with the new European
general data protection regulation (GDPR) EU 2016/679 that
defines the notion of personal data explicitly and states that
pseudonymisation should not be considered as anonymization,
though it may reduce the risks to the data subjects concerned.
The GDPR is of utmost importance since it applies to organi-
sations regardless their location if the subjects whose personal
data are processed reside in the EU. It is thus expected that
the GDPR will apply to the majority of organisations, even if
they lack establishments in the EU.
Therefore, personal data protection issues in the blockchain
are related to pseudonymisation and other privacy enhancing
technologies that may be adopted for reducing privacy risks,
like users’ behaviour profiling without their consent. Clearly,
the specific context of the blockchain under consideration is
crucial for determining the associated risks; these are higher
in permissionless ledgers, where anyone can view the whole
history of transactions. Several approaches for mitigating pri-
vacy issues have been proposed, where the majority concerns
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. However, these may also apply
appropriately adjusted to blockchain for IoT security, as their
goal is to avoid having user information revealed, which could
leave space for privacy risks; monitoring users’ activities for
profiling purposes through automated decision-making tools is
a typical example that poses significant risks for individuals’
rights and freedoms.
The use of mixing schemes is a notable privacy enhancing
approach, where many users’ transactions are mixed together;
however, the need for a third party raises security issues and
is not desirable [13]. As a response, effort has been put to get
mixing schemes operating in a transparent way so as to verify
their proper operation [2]. In any case, the privacy obtained by
such schemes needs to be evaluated since partial information
leakage still occurs. Another approach rests with cryptographic
zero knowledge (ZK) proofs, which are techniques allowing
two parties to prove that a statement is true without revealing
any information. A particular ZK proof does not necessitate
the interaction between prover and verifier and is called ZK
succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (zkSNARK).
This tool has been proposed for achieving anonymity in the
blockchain —with the Zerocash system being a characteristic
example [16]. Its main idea is that a transaction’s creator can
prove that the transaction is true without revealing sender’s or
receiver’s address and the transaction amount. A more recent
approach is the design of a privacy preserving distributed file
storage system relying on the blockchain for handling funds,
while storage providers have financial incentives to contribute
[8]; a privacy preserving payment mechanism, based on ring
signatures, and one-time addresses are at the core of system’s
design. Although the above approaches mainly target at the
financial sector, the mathematical tools they are based on may
also be applied, as stated above, to blockchain applications for
the IoT industry. In any case, it is evident that privacy issues
are not fully resolved and further research is needed.
Another challenge that blockchain applications may need to
address, to ensure compliance with the regulatory framework
in force, is how to erase personal data from the ledger if a user
revokes his consent for the processing of data —referred to as
the right to be forgotten in the GDPR. By recalling that data
in a blockchain are in general personal, such a functionality
seems to contradict the immutability property of blockchains.
Towards this end, a number of solutions could be considered.
For instance, the blockchain can contain the hash values of the
transactions and not the transactions themselves, which could
be stored separately; hence, deleting the separate transactions
seems to address the right to be forgotten —as a direct result
of the irreversibility of the hash values— without affecting the
overall structure of the blockchain.
VI. CURRENT MARKET SITUATION
Several industry players have already delivered blockchain-
based solutions, or have joined international initiatives, aiming
at strengthening the IoT. The partnership of IBM and Samsung
Electronics led to the autonomous decentralised P2P telemetry
(ADEPT) platform [1]. For building a fully decentralised IoT,
a number of functionalities were established —P2P messaging,
distributed file sharing and autonomous device coordination—
using open source protocols. In particular, Ethereum was used
for device coordination, delivering functions like registration,
authentication and consensus-based blacklisting, thus allowing
to establish mutual trust relations among the devices. Gladious
presents an interesting approach for mitigating DDoS attacks
with the use of blockchain, where the pools of nodes will be
6dynamically formed (by means of Ethereum’s smart contracts)
in order to validate requested connections and block malicious
activity; such an approach could be used to protect IoT devices
having weak/no security capabilities from being compromised
by accepting malicious connections. Other blockchain security
tools for the IoT, like Factom, Filament, and Guardtime, have
been developed (see [1]) focusing on safeguarding the integrity
of system components or that of data records.
The vast number of applications, across many industries and
sectors, that could benefit from the blockchain leads to diverse
requirements that cannot be met by a particular choice of DLT
model or consensus protocol. The Hyperledger project, which
is hosted by the Linux foundation, is a collaborative effort, by
industry leaders in finance, banking, technology, supply chain,
etc., aiming at creating open-source DLT frameworks that will
be the basis for building industry-specific blockchain solutions.
Amongst the developed frameworks, Hyperledger Fabric has a
lot of momentum, as it provides all components needed to run
enterprise private blockchains. The software features that are
provided are normally not available in public blockchains, like
multiple confidential blockchains, near-immediate transaction
finality, and no forks. Given the heterogeneity of the IoT, the
Hyperledger Fabric allows making choices to meet user needs
and easily deploy enterprise grade applications. Implementing
a global ledger of public IoT devices requires first solving the
scalability problem related to the price of a public blockchain
transaction and storage. Using a private blockchain still has
great advantage over a centralised solution: it allows common
management of a shared infrastructure with no need for being
maintained by a third-party. IoT actors could join and make
enforceable rules regarding device management.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
IoT devices have a reputation for being critically vulnerable
with a collective power allowing them to impact targets beyond
a typical attacks’ scope. Blockchain seems to offer the tools
needed for enhancing the security of IoT devices and address
key challenges. The ability to define a framework for trusted
transaction processing and coordination will allow IoT devices
to communicate with the increased transparency and auditing
that is necessary in a world of connected things. However, as
blockchain products are being developed, compliance with the
data privacy legislative and regulatory framework in force need
also be taken into account, as it may affect important aspects
of an envisaged solution. The fact that no blocks are removed
from the blockchain raises another crucial issue, which is the
need to offer long-term security.
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